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On Computability of Equilibria in Markets with Production
Jugal Garg∗ Vijay V. Vazirani†
Abstract
Although production is an integral part of the Arrow-Debreu market model, most of the work
in theoretical computer science has so far concentrated on markets without production, i.e., the ex-
change economy. This paper takes a significant step towards understanding computational aspects
of markets with production.
We first define the notion of separable, piecewise-linear concave (SPLC) production by analogy
with SPLC utility functions. We then obtain a linear complementarity problem (LCP) formulation
that captures exactly the set of equilibria for Arrow-Debreu markets with SPLC utilities and SPLC
production, and we give a complementary pivot algorithm for finding an equilibrium. This settles
a question asked by Eaves in 1975 [16] of extending his complementary pivot algorithm to markets
with production.
Since this is a path-following algorithm, we obtain a proof of membership of this problem in
PPAD, using Todd, 1976. We also obtain an elementary proof of existence of equilibrium (i.e.,
without using a fixed point theorem), rationality, and oddness of the number of equilibria. We
further give a proof of PPAD-hardness for this problem and also for its restriction to markets with
linear utilities and SPLC production. Experiments show that our algorithm runs fast on randomly
chosen examples, and unlike previous approaches, it does not suffer from issues of numerical insta-
bility. Additionally, it is strongly polynomial when the number of goods or the number of agents
and firms is constant. This extends the result of Devanur and Kannan (2008) to markets with
production.
Finally, we show that an LCP-based approach cannot be extended to PLC (non-separable)
production, by constructing an example which has only irrational equilibria.
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1 Introduction
Among the most novel and significant additions to the theory of algorithms and computational com-
plexity over the last decade are deep insights into the computability of equilibria, both Nash and
market. However, within the study of market equilibria, most of this work was concentrated on the
exchange economy, [12, 23, 7, 8, 9, 4, 6, 44, 11, 39, 32, 19, 40, 5, 14]1, i.e., the Arrow-Debreu (AD)
model [1] without production; as described in Section 1.2, the results obtained so far for markets with
production are quite rudimentary. Production is, of course, central to the Arrow-Debreu model and
to most economies, and this represents a crucial gap in the current theory. The purpose of this paper
is to address this gap.
For the exchange economy, once the case of linear utilities was settled with polynomial time
algorithms [12, 13, 24, 20, 23, 45], the next case was understanding the computability of equilibria
in markets with separable, piecewise-linear concave (SPLC) utilities. A series of remarkable works
resolved this long-standing open problem and showed it is PPAD-complete [4, 6, 39], not only for
Arrow-Debreu markets but also for Fisher markets2 [3]. However, the proof of membership in PPAD,
given in [39], was indirect – using the characterization of PPAD via the class FIXP [18].
[19] gave a direct proof of membership in PPAD by giving a path-following algorithm. This is a
complementary pivot algorithm using Lemke’s scheme [27], and it builds on a classic result of Eaves
[16] giving a similar algorithm for the linear exchange market. Another importance of the result of [19]
was that experimental results conducted on randomly generated instances showed that their algorithm
is practical; in particular, it does not suffer from issues of numerical instability that are inherent in
previous approaches, e.g., [33, 36]. In the face of PPAD-completeness of the problem, and the current
status of the P = PPAD question, this is the best one can hope for.
For the case of 2-Nash, the problem of finding a Nash equilibrium in a 2-player bimatrix game, a
path-following algorithm and membership in PPAD are provided by the classic Lemke-Howson algo-
rithm [28]; this is also a complementary pivot algorithm. We note that whereas several complementary
pivot algorithms have since been given for Nash equilibrium [27, 38, 22, 26, 43], for market equilibrium,
[19] and ours are the only such algorithms since Eaves’ work.
An example of Mas-Colell, having only irrational equilibria for Leontief utilities (stated in [16]),
shows that a similar approach is not feasible for arbitrary piecewise-linear, concave utilities. The latter
case lies in the class FIXP and proving it FIXP-hard remains an open problem.
Our work on markets with production is inspired by this development and brings it on par with
the current status of exchange markets. On the one hand, this development made our task easier.
On the other hand, unlike the case of exchange markets, where a demarcation between rational and
irrational equilibria was already well known before [19] embarked on their work (see [19] for a detailed
discussion of this issue), for markets with production, no such results were known, making our task
harder.
We first define the notion of separable, piecewise-linear concave (SPLC) production by analogy
with SPLC utility functions. We then obtain a linear complementarity problem (LCP) formulation
that captures exactly the set of equilibria for Arrow-Debreu markets with SPLC utilities and SPLC
production, and we further give a complementary pivot algorithm for finding an equilibrium. This
settles a question asked by Eaves in 1975 [16] of extending his complementary pivot algorithm to
markets with production.
Since this is a path-following algorithm, we obtain a proof of membership of this problem in PPAD,
using Todd, 1976. We also obtain an elementary proof of existence of equilibrium (i.e., without using
a fixed point theorem), rationality, and oddness of the number of equilibria. We further give a proof
1This list is by no means complete.
2Fisher market is a special case of exchange economy.
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of PPAD-hardness for this problem and also for its restriction to Arrow-Debreu markets with linear
utilities and SPLC production.
Experiments show that our algorithm is practical. We note that market equilibrium algorithms,
especially those involving production, are important in practice [35, 17]. Because of the PPAD-
completeness of the problem, ours is among the best available avenues to designing equilibrium com-
puting algorithms that can have an impact in practice. We further show that our algorithm is strongly
polynomial when the number of goods or the number of agents and firms is constant. This extends
the result of [11] to markets with production.
Finally, we show that an LCP-based approach cannot be extended to PLC (non-separable) pro-
duction, by constructing an example which has only irrational equilibria. We expect this case to be
FIXP-complete, even if utilities are linear.
Besides being practical, complementary pivot algorithms have the additional advantage that they
have provided deep insights into the problems studied in the past. A case in point is the classic
Lemke-Howson algorithm [28] for computing a Nash equilibrium of a 2-person bimatrix game, where
besides oddness of the number of equilibria, it yielded properties such as index, degree, and stability
[41, 34, 21, 42]. As stated above, we have already established that our problem has an odd number of
equilibria. We expect our algorithm to yield additional insights as well.
1.1 Salient features
Our result involves two main steps. The first is deriving an LCP whose solutions are exactly the set of
equilibria of our market with production. The second is ensuring that Lemke’s scheme is guaranteed
to converge to a solution.
Lemke’s scheme involves following the unique path that starts with the primary ray on the one-
skeleton of the associated polyhedron (see Appendix A for detailed explanation of these terms). Such
a path can end in two ways, either a solution to the LCP or a secondary ray. In the latter case,
the scheme provides no recourse and simply aborts without finding a solution. We show that the
associated polyhedron of our LCP has no secondary rays and therefore Lemke’s scheme is guaranteed
to give a solution.
Several classes of LCPs have been identified for which Lemke’s scheme converges to a solution
[31, 10]. However, none of these classes captures our LCP, or the LCPs of Eaves [16] for linear
exchange markets or [19] for SPLC exchange markets, even though they resort to a similar approach.
In the progression of these three works, the LCPs have become more involved and proving the lack of
secondary rays has become increasingly harder. Clearly, this calls for further work to understand the
underlying structure in these LCPs.
Some new ideas were needed for deriving the LCP. The LCP has to capture: (i) optimal production
plans for each firm, (ii) optimal bundle for each agent, and (iii) market clearing conditions. Given
prices, the optimal production plan of each firm can be obtained through a linear program (LP) using
variables capturing amount of raw and produced goods. Then, using complementary slackness and
feasibility conditions of these LPs, we obtain an LCP to capture the production. Next, an LCP for
consumption and market clearing is sought using variables capturing amount of goods consumed in
order to merge it with the production LCP, however it turned out to be unlikely (see Remark 3 in
Section 4 for details) and the correct way is to use variables capturing value of goods. The only way
out was to somehow convert amount variables in production LCP to value variables, which fortunately
was doable.
The resulting LCP captures market equilibria, however it has non-equilibrium solutions as well
and more importantly, it is homogeneous – the corresponding polyhedron forms a cone, with origin
being the only vertex. Similar issues arise in [16, 19] too, and they deal with these by simply imposing
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a lower bound of 1 on every price variable3. It turns out that such a trivial lower bound does not work
for our LCP; prices where no firm can make positive profit are needed (see Section 5 for details). We
recourse to the sufficiency condition no production out of nothing [1, 29] for the existence of equilibria
and show that such prices exist (using Farkas’ lemma) and can be obtained. After imposing such a
lower bound, the resulting LCP exactly captures market equilibria (up to scaling).
Next we show that our algorithm is strongly polynomial when either the number of goods or the
number of agents and firms are constant, extending the result of Devanur and Kannan [11] to markets
with production. For this, we decompose a constant dimensional space into polynomially many regions
and show that every region can contain at most one vertex traversed by our algorithm.
Since our algorithm follows a complementary path, it together with Todd’s result [37] on locally
orienting such paths, proves that the problem is in PPAD. Since every LCP has a vertex solution (if
a solution exists) in the polyhedron associated with it, there is an equilibrium with rational prices.
In the absence of secondary rays, all but one of the equilibria get paired up through complementary
paths; the remaining one with the primary ray. Therefore there are odd number of equilibria.
Market equilibrium computation in exchange markets with SPLC utilities is known to be PPAD-
hard [4, 39]. We reduce such a market to a market with linear utilities and SPLC production, thereby
proving its hardness too. This reduction is general enough, in a sense that an exchange market with
concave utilities can be reduced to an equivalent market with linear utilities and concave production.
Since linear is a special case of SPLC functions, we obtain PPAD-completeness for markets with SPLC
utilities and SPLC production.
1.2 Related work
Jain and Varadarajan [25] studied the Arrow-Debreu markets with production, and gave a polynomial
time algorithm for production and utility functions coming from a subclass of CES (constant elasticity
of substitution) functions; i.e., constant returns to scale (CRS) production. They also gave a reduction
from the exchange market with CES utilities to a linear utilities market in which firms have CES
production. Our reduction from the exchange market to a linear utilities market with arbitrary
production is inspired by their reduction but is more general.
We note that CRS production is relatively easy to deal with, since there is no positive profit to
any firm at an equilibrium. To the best of our knowledge, no computational work has been done for
the original Arrow-Debreu market with decreasing returns to scale production.
1.3 Organization of the paper
In Section 2, we define Arrow-Debreu market model and present an example of markets with linear
utilities and PLC production having only irrational equilibria. Markets with SPLC utilities and SPLC
production, and the sufficiency conditions for the existence of equilibrium are defined in Section 3.
Equilibrium characterization as complementarity conditions is presented in Section 4. In Section 5, we
derive an LCP formulation which captures exactly the set of equilibria of markets with SPLC utilities
and SPLC production. The algorithm and the proof of convergence appears in Section 6. Section
7 presents a strongly polynomial bound for our algorithm when either the number of goods or the
number of agents plus firms is constant. For the hardness result, we derive a general reduction from an
exchange market to a market with production with linear utilities in Section 8. Finally, experimental
results are presented in Section 9, demonstrating that our algorithm is practical.
3This is without loss of generality as market equilibrium prices are scale invariant [1]
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2 The Arrow-Debreu Market Model
The market model defined by Arrow and Debreu [1] consists of the following: A set G of divisible
goods, a set A of agents and a set F of firms. Let n denote the number of goods in the market.
The production capabilities of firm f is defined by a set of production possibility vectors (PVVs)
Yf ; in a vector negative coordinates represent inputs and positive coordinates represents output. The
set of input and output goods for each firm is disjoint. Standard assumptions on set Yf are (see [1]):
1. Set Yf is closed and convex; convexity captures law of diminishing returns.
2. Downward close - additional raw goods do not decrease the production.
3. No production out of nothing - firms together can not produce something out of nothing, i.e.,
⊕f∈FYf ∩ Rn+ = 0.
The goal of a firm is to produce as per a profit maximizing (optimal) schedule. Firms are owned
by agents: θif is the profit share of agent i in firm f such that ∀f ∈ F ,
∑
i∈A θ
i
f = 1.
Each agent i comes with an initial endowment of goods; wij is amount of good j with agent i.
The preference of an agent i over bundles of goods is captured by a non-negative, non-decreasing and
concave utility function U i : Rn+ → R+. U i can be assumed to be non-decreasing is due to free disposal
property, and concavity captures the law of diminishing marginal returns. Each agent wants to buy
a (optimal) bundle of goods that maximizes her utility to the extent allowed by her earned money
– from initial endowment and profit shares in the firms. Without loss of generality, we assume that
total initial endowment of every good is 1, i.e,
∑
i∈A w
i
j = 1,∀j ∈ G4.
Given prices of goods, if there is an assignment of optimal production schedule to each firm and
optimal affordable bundle to each agent so that there is neither deficiency nor surplus of any good, then
such prices are called market clearing or market equilibrium prices. The market equilibrium problem is
to find such prices when they exist. In a celebrated result, Arrow and Debreu [1] proved that market
equilibrium always exists under some mild conditions, however the proof is non-constructive and uses
heavy machinery of Kakutani fixed point theorem.
Note that operating point of a firm, at any given prices, is on the boundary of Yf , which can
be defined by a concave function/correspondence. To work under finite precision model concave is
generally approximated with piecewise-linear concave.
A well studied restriction of Arrow-Debreu model is exchange economy, i.e., markets without
production firms.
2.1 PLC production and irrationality
In this section we demonstrate an example of a market with (non-separable) PLC production and the
simplest utility functions, namely linear, having only irrational equilibrium prices and allocations.
Consider a market with three goods, three agents and one firm. The initial endowments of agents
are w1 = w2 = w3 = (1, 1, 0). Each utility function has one linear segment; U1 = x
1
1, U2 = x
2
2 and
U3 = x
3
3. The firm is owned by agent 3, i.e., θ
3
1 = 1. It has exactly one production segment without
any upper limit on the raw material used, and needs two units of good 1 and a unit of good 2 to
produce a unit of good 3. This is a Leontief (PLC) production function where the quantities of raw
goods are needed in a fixed proportion. Let rj ’s and sj’s respectively be the amount of goods used
and produced by the firm on its only segment, then they should satisfy: 2 · s3 ≤ r1 and s3 ≤ r2.
Let p = (p1, p2, p3) denote the price of goods. Note that at an equilibrium of this market all prices
must be positive, otherwise the demand of zero priced goods will be infinite. Since equilibrium prices
4This is like redefining the unit of goods by appropriately scaling utility and production parameters.
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are scale invariant [1], we set p1 = 1. The firm will produce at equilibrium due to positive demand of
good 3 from agent 3, however its profit will be zero otherwise it will want to produce infinite amount.
Hence we have p3 = 2 + p2. From the market clearing conditions, we get p
2
2 + 2p2 − 2 = 0. Thus the
only equilibrium prices of this market are p1 = 1, p2 =
√
3 − 1 and p3 = (1+
√
3)/2. At equilibrium the
allocation and production variables are: x11 =
√
3, x22 =
√
3/(
√
3−1) and x33 = s3 = r1/2 = r2 =
√
3/(
√
3+1).
This rules out the possibility of linear complementarity problem (LCP) formulation for PLC pro-
duction, because LCPs always have a rational solution (if one exists) given that all input parameters
are rational numbers. The next logical step is to consider separable PLC (SPLC) production instead,
together with SPLC utilities, as PLC utility functions are already known to have irrationality [15].
3 Markets with SPLC Utility & SPLC Production
In this section, we define parameters representing separable piecewise-linear concave (SPLC) utility
and SPLC production functions. All the parameters are assumed to be rational numbers.
For each pair of agent i and good j we are specified a non-decreasing, piecewise-linear and concave
(PLC) function U ij : R+ → R+, which gives the utility that i derives as a function of the amount
of good j that she receives. Her overall utility, U i(x), for a bundle x = (x1, . . . , xn) of goods is
additively separable over the goods, i.e., U i(x) =
∑
j∈G U
i
j(xj). The number of segments in function
U ij is denoted by |U ij |, and the kth segment of U ij by (i, j, k). The slope of a segment specifies the rate
at which the agent derives utility per unit of additional good received. Suppose segment (i, j, k) has
domain [a, b] ⊆ R+, and slope c. Then, we define uijk = c and lijk = b − a. The length of the last
segment is infinity. Since U ij is concave, u
i
j(k−1) > u
i
jk, ∀k ≥ 2.
In this paper we consider the case where every firm produces a good using a set of goods as raw
material and the production function is additively separable over goods. For simplicity, we assume
that each firm produces exactly one good5. Let firm f produces good jf .
For each pair of firm f and good j we are specified a production function P fj : R+ → R+ which
is non-negative, non-decreasing, PLC, and defines f ’s ability to produce good jf as a function of the
amount of good j. The overall production of the firm f from a bundle x = (x1, . . . , xn) of goods
is: P f (x) =
∑
j∈G P
f
j (xj). The number of segments in P
f
j is denoted by |P fj |, and the kth segment
by (f, j, k). The slope of a segment specifies the rate at which good jf can be produced from a unit
of additional good j. Suppose segment (f, j, k) has domain [a, b] ⊆ R+, and slope c, then we define
αfjk = c and o
f
jk = b − a. This implies that on segment (f, j, k), firm f can produce αfjk amount of
good jf from a unit amount of good j and at this rate it can use up to o
f
jk units of good j. The length
of the last segment is infinity. Since P fj is concave, α
f
j(k−1) > α
f
jk ∀k ≥ 2.
Given prices p = (p1, . . . , pn) for the goods, each firm operates on a production schedule that
maximizes its profit − money earned from the production minus the money spent on the raw material.
Let Ef denote the profit of firm j. Agent i earns∑j∈G wijpj from the initial endowment and
∑
f∈F θ
i
fEf
from the profit shares in firms, and buys a bundle of goods that maximizes her utility. Prices p gives
an equilibrium if market clears when each firm produces at an optimal plan and each agent buys an
optimal bundle. We will denote this market, with SPLC production and SPLC utilities, by M.
3.1 Sufficiency conditions
In general there may not exist market equilibrium prices; in fact, for the special case of exchange
market with SPLC utilities, it is NP-hard to determine if they exist [39]. However, an equilibrium is
5This is without loss of generality since production is separable. For a firm producing multiple goods we can create
as many firms as number of produced goods with agent’s shares being duplicated.
5
guaranteed to exist under certain sufficient conditions. The nine conditions given by Maxfield [29] are
the weakest known sufficiency conditions for the existence. Out of these, seven are trivially satisfied
by our model. The remaining two are described next.
One is the condition (3) of Section 2, which translates to the following for the SPLC production:
It says that firms together can not produce something out of nothing [29, 1]. For example, suppose
firm 1 can produce a unit amount of good 1 from a unit of good 2 and from this unit amount of good 1
suppose firm 2 can produce 2 units of good 2. At the end of such a production we have no decrease in
any good, and good 2 is increased by one unit. In other words good 2 can be produced from nothing,
which is unnatural. In addition we disallow vacuous productions as well6, and assume that in every
production cycle quantity of at least one good reduces.
In case of SPLC production, since the production functions are concave, the returns are decreasing.
Hence, checking these conditions using the first segments of P fj ’s suffices for all the combinations of
production possibility vectors. Firm f needs at least 1/αfj1 units of good j to produce one unit of good
jf . Let GF (M) be a weighted directed graph, where goods are nodes and the weight of an edge from
j to j′ is maxf,jf=j′ 1/α
f
j1.
Definition 1 (No production out of nothing [1, 29]) We say that market M satisfies no pro-
duction out of nothing if weights of edges in every cycle of GF (M) multiply to strictly less than one.
For the second condition, we say that agent i is non-satiated by good j if the last segment of U ij
has positive slope, i.e., ui
j|U ij |
> 0. Similarly, firm f is non-satiated by good j if the last segment of P fj
has positive slope, i.e., αf
j|P fj |
> 0.
Definition 2 (Strong connectivity) Construct a directed graph G(M) whose nodes correspond to
agents and firms of market M and there is an edge from node a to node b if there is a good pos-
sessed/produced by node a for which node b is non-satiated. Market M satisfies strong connectivity if
this graph has a strongly connected component containing all the agent nodes.
This condition also makes sure that every agent has a positive amount of at least one good in her
initial endowment. Henceforth we will assume that market M satisfies no production out of nothing
and strong connectivity conditions.
4 Equilibrium Characterization and LCP Formulation
For equilibrium characterization, we need to capture (i) optimal production plans for each firm, (ii)
optimal bundles for each agent, and (iii) market clearing conditions.
Optimal production. Recall that on segment (f, j, k), αfjk units of good jf can be produced using a
unit of good j. Given prices p, the optimal production plan of firm f is given by the following linear
program (LP), where xfjk denote the amount of raw good j used by firm f on (f, j, k):
maximize
∑
j,k
xfjk(α
f
jkpjf − pj) subject to 0 ≤ xfjk ≤ ofjk, ∀(j, k) (1)
Note that since αfjk > α
f
j(k+1),∀k, an optimal solution of this LP will have xfjk = ofjk whenever
xf
j(k+1) > 0. This is required for an optimal production plan as x
f
jk’s have to be allocated in order.
6This was assumed by Arrow-Debreu, but not by Maxfield. We enforce this to avoid unnecessary complications in
the proofs later. Dropping this assumption will introduce degeneracy, which can be handled.
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Let βfjk be the dual variable corresponding to inequality x
f
jk ≤ ofjk. From the optimality conditions,
we get the following linear constraints and complementarity conditions (We will refer to these as
follows: the equation number will refer to the constraint and the equation number with a prime will
refer to the complementarity condition, e.g., (2) refers to the first constraint below and (2’) refers to
the corresponding complementarity condition.). All variables introduced will have a non-negativity
constraint; for the sake of brevity, we will not write them explicitly.
∀(j, k) : αfjkpjf − pj ≤ βfjk and xfjk(αfjkpjf − pj − βfjk) = 0 (2)
∀(j, k) : xfjk ≤ ofjk and βfjk(xfjk − ofj′k) = 0 (3)
Note that (2) and 3) are equivalent to the above LP due to strong duality. Combining these
for all the firms gives us a linear complementarity problem (LCP) formulation that capture optimal
production. The amount produced on segment (f, j, k) is
yfjk = α
f
jkx
f
jk.
Next we need to characterize and derive an LCP to capture optimal bundles of each agent, and
market clearing conditions. Suppose xijk denote the amount of good j obtained by agent i on segment
(i, j, k), then i spends
∑
j,k x
i
jkpj, which is a quadratic term. It turned out to be unlikely to capture
this through an LCP in amount variables; see Remark 3 for details. Therefore we need to use qijk in
place of xijkpj , representing money spent by agent i on segment (i, j, k). Further, we need same type
of variables in production LCP to tie everything in goods side market clearing condition.
Remark 3 Suppose there is an LCP in amount variables x and price variables p for the linear ex-
change market, where xij denotes the amount of good j allocated to agent i. The idea is to write
optimal production plans for firms with Leontief production as linear complementarity constraints in
(x,p) and then incorporate them with the LCP for the linear exchange market. For example, the
optimal production plan for a firm which produces 1 unit of good 3 using b units of good 1 and c units
of good 2 can be written as follows, where r1 and r2 respectively captures the amount of goods 1 and 2
used as raw materials and s3 captures the amount of good 3 produced:
p3 ≤ bp1 + cp2, s3 ≥ 0, s3(p3 − bp1 − cp2) = 0
r1 = bs3, r2 = cs3
Since production of this firm is constant returns to scale, it can not make positive profit at an
equilibrium. Further, it produces if and only if the profit is zero. The first set of constraints capture
the same. The second set of equalities capture the amount of raw material needed to produce s3 units
of good 3. Similarly we can write linear complementarity constraints for all the firms. They together
with the LCP for the linear exchange model, with variables si’s and ri’s added at appropriate places,
give us an LCP for markets with linear utilities and Leontief production, contradicting its irrationality
(see Section 2.1).
The only recourse is to convert amount variables in production LCP to money variables. It turns
out to be doable, though not immediately clear, using complementarity and change of variables. We
multiply both the equations in (3) by pj and replace the expression x
f
jkpj by r
f
jk denoting the money
spent on raw material j on segment (f, j, k). Assuming that pj > 0,∀j ∈ G at equilibrium, conditions
(2) and (3) can be replaced with the following.
∀(f, j, k) : αfjkpjf − pj ≤ βfjk and rfjk(αfjkpjf − pj − βfjk) = 0 (4)
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∀(f, j, k) : rfjk ≤ ofjkpj and βfjk(rfjk − ofjkpj) = 0 (5)
To capture produced amount let sfjk denote the revenue of firm f on segment (f, j, k), namely
yfjkpjf . Directly replacing y
f
jk with
s
f
jk/pjf and x
f
jk with
r
f
jk/pj in y
f
jk = α
f
jkx
f
jk will give quadratic
equality. Instead, we observe that βfjk captures the profit per unit of raw material on segment (f, j, k)
when rfjk > 0. Further, if β
f
jk > 0, then the firm utilizes segment (f, j, k) completely. Putting these
together we include the following equalities, where Ef captures the profit of firm f .
∀(f, j, k) : sfjk = rfjk + ofjkβfjk and ∀f : Ef =
∑
j,k
ofjkβ
f
jk (6)
Clearly, according to f ’s optimal plan it produces the positive profit segments completely, and
does not produce the segments giving negative profit at all. It is indifferent between producing on
zero profit segments.
Remark 4 We note that, even though one can write a linear program to compute optimal production
plan in case of (non-separable) PLC production as well, there can not exists an LCP formulation to
capture equilibria for markets with PLC production. This follows from the example of such a market
in Section 2.1 with only irrational equilibrium prices and allocations.
Market clearing. The market clearing constraints are easier now. Let qijk be a variable that denotes
the amount of money spent by agent i for buying good j corresponding to segment (i, j, k). The
following constraints capture the market clearing, where F(j) denote the set of firms producing good j,
and λi is related to optimal bundle of agent i and is defined below; we have included the corresponding
complementarity conditions in order to obtain an LCP in the standard form.
∀j ∈ G :
∑
i,k
qijk +
∑
f,k
rfjk ≤ pj +
∑
f∈F(j),j′,k
sfj′k and pj(
∑
i,k
qijk +
∑
f,k
rfjk − pj −
∑
f∈F(j),j′,k
sfj′k) = 0 (7)
∀i ∈ A :
∑
j
wijpj +
∑
f
θifEf ≤
∑
j,k
qijk and λi(
∑
j
wijpj +
∑
f
θifEf −
∑
j,k
qijk) = 0 (8)
Optimal bundle. Given prices p, earnings of each agent is fixed, i.e., for agent i it is
∑
j w
i
jpj +∑
f θ
i
fEf . Therefore, she will try to spend her money where utility per unit of money, also called
bang-per-buck, is maximum; on segment (i, j, k) it is bpbijk = u
i
jk/pj. We take 0/0 as 0. Hence, optimal
bundle of agent i can be computed as follows: sort all her segments by decreasing bang per buck
and partition them by equality, i.e., each equivalence class will consist of all segments having equal
bang-per-buck. Let the classes be: Q1, Q2, . . .. At prices p, the segments in Ql make i strictly happier
than those in Ql+1, Ql+2, . . .. Hence, she would start buying partitions in order, until all her money
is exhausted. Suppose she exhausts all her money at kthi partition. The segments in partitions 1 to
ki−1 will be called forced, those in partition ki will be called flexible and those in partitions ki+1 and
higher will be called undesirable. Indeed, every optimal bundle is obtained in this manner: it must
fully allocate all segments in the forced partitions; the money left over after this allocation is spent on
segments in the flexible partition in any manner, since all these segments have equal bang per buck;
and no allocation is made corresponding to segments in undesirable partitions.
Introduce a variable λi that captures inverse of the bang-per-buck of the flexible partition. In
order to capture segments of forced partition, variable γijk is introduced so that if (i, j, k) is forced,
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then 1/λi = u
i
jk/(pj+γijk); supplement prices. The following constraints from [19] ensure optimal bundle
to each agents.
∀(i, j, k) : uijkλi ≤ pj + γijk and qijk(uijkλi − pj − γijk) = 0 (9)
∀(i, j, k) : qijk ≤ lijkpj and γijk(qijk − lijkpj) = 0 (10)
Let us denote the LCP defined by the sets of constraints and complementarity conditions given in
(4) through (10), together with non-negativity on all variables, as AD-LCP.
Lemma 5 Any equilibrium of market M yields a solution to AD-LCP.
Proof : Let p be a market equilibrium prices. Let xfjk’s be the bundle of raw material used by firms
at the equilibrium. For segment (f, j, k), set variables rfjk = x
f
jkpj, β
f
jk = α
f
jkpjf − pj, and sfjk and Ef
accordingly. Since xfjk’s and β
f
jk’s satisfies (2) and (3), it follows that for the set values conditions (4),
(4’), (5) and (5’) are satisfied. Set sfjk and Ef as per (6) and (6’) respectively; they are revenue and
profit at optimal production.
Let xijk’s be the bundle of goods obtained by the agents at the equilibrium. Set q
i
jk = x
i
jkpj .
Agent i earns
∑
j w
i
jpj +
∑
f θ
i
fEf and spends the same amount. Therefore (7) holds with equality,
consequently (7’) is also satisfied. Similarly due to market clearing from good side we get that (8) too
holds with equality.
For agent i set variable λi to the inverse of the bang-per-buck of her last bought segment. substitute
for the variables γijk as follows: if segment (i, j, k) is flexible or undesirable, set it to zero, and if it is
forced, set it so that the following equality is satisfied
1
λi
=
uijk
pj + γ
i
jk
.
Clearly, all the γijk’s satisfy non-negativity. Now, it is easy to verify that in each of the three cases –
that the segment (i, j, k) is forced, flexible or undesirable – the constraints (9) and (10), and comple-
mentarity conditions (9’) and (10’) are all satisfied. ✷
Since LCPs always have rational solutions (if one exists), next corollary follows from Lemma 5.
Corollary 6 In a market with SPLC utilities and SPLC production functions, equilibrium prices and
allocations are rational up to scaling.
Corollary 7 Checking existence of an equilibrium in AD market with SPLC utilities and SPLC pro-
duction is NP-complete.
Proof : Since exchange market with SPLC utilities is a special case, the NP-hardness follows
from the result of [39]. Given prices it can be checked in polynomial time if corresponding optimal
production plan and optimal bundles yield market clearing using their characterization, since all the
values are rational (Corollary 6). Thus containment in NP follows. ✷
AD-LCP suffers from two shortcomings. First, since the rhs vector of the constraints, denoted by q
in Appendix A, is zero (homogeneous system), the polyhedron is highly degenerate – in fact, it is a
cone with its vertex at the origin. Second, AD-LCP may admit solutions that do not correspond to
equilibria; suppose there is a subset G′ ⊂ G of goods, for which every firm producing a good in G \ G′
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are satiated. Let G′ = G \ G′. Suppose, for firm f , jf ∈ G′ can produce d amount from a good j′ ∈ G′,
i.e., d =
∑
k≤|P fj |
αfjko
f
jk, then remove P
f
j and change endowments of agents as w
i
jf
= wijf + θ
i
fd.
Do this for every pair of jf ∈ G′ and j ∈ G′. Now, find an equilibrium for the market consisting
of agents of A, goods of G′ and firms producing G′. Set the corresponding variables in accordance
with this equilibrium. For each good j ∈ G′, set pj = 0 and for each segment (i, j, k) of this good
corresponding to agents, set qijk = 0 and γ
i
jk = u
i
jkλi. Further, each segment (f, j
′, k), where jf = j,
set rfj′k = β
f
j′k = 0 and accordingly s
f
j′k and Ef . For a firm f with jf ∈ G′ and good j ∈ G′ if αfjk > 0,
then set βfjk = α
f
jkpj and accordingly s
f
jk and Ef . One can verify that this is a solution to AD-LCP,
but may not be a market equilibrium.
The next section circumvents both these shortcomings by constructing a non-homogeneous LCP,
where the rhs vector is non-zero and has negative entries.
5 Non-Homogeneous LCP
In this section first we ensure that prices are positive at every equilibrium, and then dehomogenize
AD-LCP by imposing appropriate lower bounds on price variables and show that it exactly captures
the market equilibria.
Recall that the lengths of
j|P fj |
and li
j|U ij |
of last segments, for all pairs of (f, j)’s and (i, j)’s, are
infinite. Using the sufficiency conditions of Section 3.1, next we calculate their values that are never
reached at an equilibrium. Since no firm operates at loss at an equilibrium, we get the following:
Claim 8 Given prices p 6= 0, consider a graph where firms are nodes and there is an edge from jf to
j if the profit on segment (f, j, 1) is non-negative. This graph is acyclic.
Proof : If there is a cycle, then non-negative profit on each of those edges implies that the weights
on the same cycle in GF (M) of no production out of nothing condition will multiply to at least one,
contradicting the same condition. ✷
Claim 8 implies that there cannot be a cycle of productions at any equilibrium, however there may
be chains. Total endowment of each good brought by agents is one. Let αmax = max(f,j,k) α
f
jk and
αmin = min(f,j,k),αf
jk
6=0 α
f
jk. It is easy to see that the maximum production a firm can do at the end of
a chain is L = nn(αmax+1)
n. Therefore, we set of
j|P fj |
= L/max{1,αmin},∀(f, j) and lij|U ij | = L+1, ∀(i, j),
which are safe limits.
For a good j, define desire(j) to be the total amount represented by its non-zero utility segments,
i.e., desire(j) =
∑
(i,k):ui
jk
>0 l
i
jk.
Lemma 9 If desire(j) > 1, ∀j ∈ G then p > 0 in every equilibrium.
Proof : Let p be an equilibrium prices. If no firm is producing at these prices, then agents’ demand
for a good with zero price will be more than one, hence the lemma holds. Suppose firms are producing,
then due to Claim 8 there can be only paths of production among goods; last good, say g, on this
path is not getting produced. Further, if the price of any good is zero on this path, the price of good
g has to be zero, since a zero priced good can be produced using zero priced goods only (or else there
will be losses). In that case, demand of good will be more than supply, a contradiction. ✷
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Henceforth we assume that desire(j) > 1, ∀j ∈ G, and call this condition enough demand7. In that
case since the equilibrium prices are positive, and they are known to be scale invariant, we can lower
bound them with positive numbers. This will lead to non-zero rhs in the LCP. We will want that
negative rhs appears only in the agent side market clearing condition (8). This is needed to ensure
that all the equilibrium conditions except market clearing are satisfied on the path followed by the
algorithm, which is crucial to prove convergence of the algorithm.
Suppose, we lower bound pj by a positive number cj . We do this by replacing pj with p
′
j + cj in
AD-LCP. Note that, rhs of (8) will be surely negative, nothing can be said about (4) and the rest
will be positive. Now to keep the rhs of (4) non-negative, we need cj − αfjkcjf ≥ 0, ∀(f, j, k), i.e., no
positive profit on segment (f, j, k) at prices c. We need a feasible point of the following polyhedron
to compute such a vector c,
∀(f, j, k) : αfjkcjf ≤ cj
∀j : cj ≥ 1
(11)
Since the first condition of (11) is homogeneous, setting all cj ’s to zeros is a solution, hence the
second condition. Denote the polyhedron of (11) by C.
Lemma 10 Polyhedron C is non-empty and has a non-empty interior.
Proof : Taking logarithms, the first condition of (11) transforms to log(cjf )− log(cj) ≤ − log αfjk.
and the second condition to log(cj) ≥ 0. Rename log(cj) by ej ; this gives a system analogues to Ax ≤ b.
By Farkas’ lemma this does not have a solution if and only if there is a y ≥ 0, yTA = 0, yT b = −1
[2]. It is easy to check that for our system of equations, existence of such a y implies a cycle of weight
at least zero in the graph between goods, where there is an edge from j to jf with weight α
f
jk. This
contradicts no production out of nothing assumption. Further, this condition also implies that there
is no cycle with log αfjk’s adding to zero, hence C has a non-empty interior. ✷
Take a vector c from the interior of C; such a vector exists by Lemma 10. Replace pj with p′j + cj
in AD-LCP, and the resulting LCP, call it NHAD-LCP, is as follows. There are non-negativity
constraints on all the variables, however for brevity we omit them.
∀(f, j, k) : αfjkp′jf − p′j − βfjk ≤ cj − αfjkcjf and rfjk
(
αfjk(p
′
jf
+ cjf )− (p′j + cj)− βfjk
)
= 0 (12)
∀(f, j, k) : rfjk − ofjkp′j ≤ ofjkcj and βfjk(rfjk − ofjk(p′j + cj)) = 0 (13)
∀(f, j, k) : sfjk = rfjk + ofjkβfjk and ∀f ∈ F : Ef =
∑
j,k o
f
jkβ
f
jk (14)
∀j ∈ G :
∑
i,k
qijk +
∑
f,k
rfjk − p′j −
∑
f∈F(j),j′,k
sfj′k ≤ cj and p′j(
∑
i,k
qijk +
∑
f,k
rfjk − (p′j + cj)−
∑
f∈F(j),j′,k
sfj′k) = 0 (15)
∀i ∈ A :
∑
j
wijp
′
j +
∑
f
θifEf −
∑
j,k
qijk ≤ −
∑
j
wijcj and λi(
∑
j
wij(p
′
j + cj) +
∑
f
θifEf −
∑
j,k
qijk) = 0
(16)
∀(i, j, k) : uijkλi − p′j − γijk ≤ cj and qijk(uijkλi − (p′j + cj)− γijk) = 0 (17)
7A stronger condition may be derived to ensure non-zero prices at equilibrium, however we stick to this one for
simplicity.
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∀(i, j, k) : qijk − lijkp′j ≤ lijkcj and γijk(qijk − lijk(p′j + cj)) = 0 (18)
The following lemmas establish a strong connection between solutions of NHAD-LCP and the
equilibrium conditions for market M.
Lemma 11 In any solution to NHAD-LCP, each firm produces as per profit maximizing production
plan w.r.t. the prices of goods given by this solution.
Proof : Given a solution, consider prices p = p′+c. Let xfjk =
r
f
jk/pj and y
f
jk =
s
f
jk/pjf be the amount
of used and produced goods on segment (f, j, k). These are well defined since pj’s are positive. Now we
will show that xfjk’s, β
f
jk’s and p satisfy the optimality conditions (2) and (3), and also y
f
jk = α
f
jkx
f
jk,
for all (f, j, k).
For a firm f observe that xfjk’s and β
f
jk’s are non-negative and satisfy conditions (2) and (3) since
(12) and (13) are satisfied at the given solution. Therefore they form a solution of LP (1) at prices pj
and hence xfjk’s give the amounts to be used at optimal production plan.
Next we show that yfjk = α
f
jkx
f
jk indeed holds. If x
f
jk > 0 then from (12) we have β
f
jk = α
f
jkpjf −pj.
If βfjk = 0 then from (14) we have s
f
jk = r
f
jk. In this case,
yfjk =
sfjk
pjf
= αfjk
rfjk
pj
= αfjkx
f
jk
If βfjk > 0 then using (13’) we have r
f
jk = o
f
jkpj and x
f
jk = o
f
jk, and using (14) s
f
jk = r
f
jk + o
f
jkβ
f
jk.
yfjk =
sfjk
pjf
=
rfjk + o
f
jkβ
f
jk
pjf
=
ofjkpj + o
f
jk(α
f
jkpjf − pj)
pjf
= αfjkx
f
jk
Further, since βfjk captures profit on segment (f, j, k), if non-negative, variable Ef captures the
total profit of firm f (due to (14’)). ✷
Lemma 12 Each agent receives an optimal bundle of goods at a solution of NHAD-LCP, w.r.t. the
prices of goods given by this solution.
Proof : Given a solution let the prices be p = p′ + c. Consider an agent i. First observe that
λi > 0, for otherwise (17) will be satisfied as a strict inequality hence forcing, via (17’), q
i
jk = 0 for
each segment of i and hence contradicting market clearing.
Among all segments of i on which a positive allocation has been made, consider one having the
lowest bang-per-buck, say it is (i, j, k). Let Q be the partition it belongs to and let its bang-per-buck
be
uijk
pj
=
1
σi
.
Now, by the constraint (17) for this segment, and the non-negativity of γijk, we get that λi ≥ σi.
Define Q to be the flexible partition, all partitions having bang-per-buck strictly higher than 1/σi to
be forced partitions, and all partitions having bang-per-buck strictly lower than 1/σi to be undesirable
partitions. Next, we will prove that the names given are in accordance with those in Section 4.
Consider an arbitrary segment of i, say (i, j, k). If it is in a forced partition, it must have γijk > 0
in order to satisfy (17). As a result, in order to satisfy (18’), the inequality (18) must be satisfied
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with equality, i.e., this segment is fully allocated. And if (i, j, k) is in an undesirable partition, it must
satisfy (17) as a strict inequality. Hence, qijk = 0 by (17’), i.e., it is totally unallocated.
Finally, if (i, j, k) ∈ Q, there are two cases. If λi > σi, then in order to satisfy (17), γijk > 0.
Again, in order to satisfy (18’), the inequality (18) must be satisfied with equality, i.e., all segments
in partition Q must be fully allocated. And if λi = σi, γ
i
jk = 0 in order to satisfy (17). As a result,
the only constraints on qijk are that 0 ≤ qijk ≤ lijkpj , i.e., the allocation on this segment is flexible. In
order to satisfy market clearing, in both cases, the total money spent on segments in Q must exhaust
all the money of i that is remaining after all forced partitions are allocated.
In both cases we get that 1/λi is a lower bound on the bang-per-buck of the flexible partition, i.e.,
1/σi, as was promised. Also, by the characterization given in Section 4, i receives an optimal bundle
of goods. ✷
Market clearing, proved in next lemma, is relatively easy.
Lemma 13 Given a solution of NHAD-LCP, constraints of (15) and (16) ensures that market clears
w.r.t. the prices at the solution.
Proof : Adding the constraints in (15) over all goods and those in (16) over all agents, and using
(14) we get ∑
i,j,k
qijk ≤
∑
j
pj +
∑
f,j,k
ofjkβ
f
jk and
∑
i,j
wijpj +
∑
i,f
θifEf ≤
∑
i,j,k
qijk,
respectively. Since
∑
f,j,k o
f
jkβ
f
jk =
∑
f Ef ,
∑
i θ
i
f = 1 and
∑
i,j w
i
jpj =
∑
j pj, both these inequalities
are equalities. Finally, by non-negative, all the constraints in (15) and (16) must hold with equality,
hence proving the lemma. ✷
Lemmas 11, 12 and 13 establishes all three requirements of market equilibrium. They together
with Lemma 5 gives the following theorem.
Theorem 14 The solutions of NHAD-LCP capture exactly the equilibria of market M with SPLC
production and SPLC utilities, up to scaling.
Theorem 14 settles the appropriate subcase of the open problem posed by Eaves (1975) [15] and
Garg et al. [19], of formulating an LCP to capture equilibria of markets with production.
6 Algorithm
From Theorem 14 computing an equilibrium of market M reduces to solving NHAD-LCP, which has
the same form as the formulation given in (20) in Appendix A; equalities (14) can be removed by
replacing sfjk’s and Ef with corresponding expressions. Let M and q be the matrix and rhs vector
formed by the inequalities of NHAD-LCP, and let y be the variable vector such that NHAD-LCP can
be written as My ≤ q, y ≥ 0, yT (My − q) = 0.
Since the rhs vector q does have negative entries, namely in (16), Lemke’s algorithm is applicable
(Refer to Appendix A for detailed description of Lemke’s algorithm). We will add the z variable only
in the constraints and complementarity conditions that have a negative rhs. Thus we need to make
two changes to NHAD-LCP to obtain the augmented LCP, which we call NHAD-LCP’. First, we
change (16) as follows:
∀i ∈ A :
∑
j
wijp
′
j +
∑
f
θifEf −
∑
j,k
qijk − z ≤ −
∑
j
wijcj and
λi(
∑
j w
i
j(p
′
j + cj) +
∑
f θ
i
fEf −
∑
j,k q
i
jk − z) = 0
(19)
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Table 1: Algorithm for markets with SPLC utilities and SPLC production
Initialization: Let y′ ← y′0.
While z > 0 in the current solution y′, do
Suppose at y′ we have y′i = 0 and (M
′y′ − q)i = 0, i.e., i is the double label.
If (M ′y′ − q)i just became 0 at the current vertex, then pivot by relaxing y′i = 0.
Else, pivot by relaxing (M ′y′ − q)i = 0.
If a new vertex is reached, then reinitialize y′ with it.
Else output ‘Secondary ray’. Exit.
Endwhile Output solution y′.
Second, we impose non-negativity on z. Clearly, solutions of NHAD-LCP’ with z = 0 are solutions
of NHAD-LCP as well, and hence are market equilibria (Theorem 14). Let the polyhedron of NHAD-
LCP’ be denoted by P ′.
Degeneracy. The Lemke’s scheme assumes that the polyhedron associated with the augmented LCP
(NHAD-LCP’ in our case) is non-degenerate (Appendix A). It turns out that polyhedron P ′ has an
inherent degeneracy at points with z = 0, so we need to clarify the non-degeneracy assumption we are
making. The degeneracy comes about because of the following fact established in the proof of Lemma
13: adding the constraints in (15) over all goods and those in (19) over all agents yields two identical
equations.
Henceforth, we will say that the polyhedron P ′ corresponding to NHAD-LCP’ is non-degenerate
if it has no other degeneracy.
Let M ′ be the augmented matrix of NHAD-LCP’ and y′ be the corresponding variable vector (y, z).
Recall from Appendix A that the set of solutions of NHAD-LCP’, called S, consists of paths and cycles.
Our algorithm traverses one such path starting from the primary ray – unbounded edge of S where
y = 0. Except for the primary ray all other unbounded edges in S with z > 0 are called secondary
rays. Clearly, z = maxi
∑
j w
i
jcj and all other variables zero is a solution vertex of NHAD-LCP’, call
it y′0; it is also the vertex of the primary ray.
The algorithm can never cycle or get stuck (no double label found) as discussed in Appendix A. It
terminates when either z becomes zero or a secondary ray is reached. In the former case we obtain a
solution of the original NHAD-LCP and hence a market equilibrium (Theorem 14). In the latter case,
there is no recourse and the algorithm simply aborts without finding a solution. Next we show that
this case never occurs.
6.1 No secondary rays in polyhedron P ′
In this section we show that the polyhedron of NHAD-LCP’ does not have secondary rays. The proof is
case by case basis and some what involved as we need to keep track of all the different variables. First
we establish a few facts about the points of S, crucial for the proof. (solutions of NHAD-LCP’). W.r.t.
a solution (y, z) to NHAD-LCP’, define the surplus of agent i to be the difference of her earnings and
the amount of money she spends, i.e.,
∑
j w
i
j(p
′
j + cj) +
∑
f θ
i
fEf −
∑
j,k q
i
jk.
Lemma 15 At a solution (y, z) of NHAD-LCP’, surplus of every agent is non-negative, and is at
most z. Further, if each good is fully sold then z = 0.
Proof : If λi = 0 then for each segment (i, j, k) of i, (17) is satisfied with strict inequality. Hence,
by (17’), qijk = 0. Hence i does not spend any money and her surplus equals her earnings which is
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positive, and by (16) it is at most z. If λi > 0 then by (19’), z =
∑
j w
i
j(cj + p
′
j)+
∑
f θ
i
fEf −
∑
j,k q
i
jk,
which is the surplus of i; a non-negative quantity.
For the second part, since each good j is fully sold, (15) hold with equality for all j. Adding these
over all goods we get
∑
i,j,k q
i
jk =
∑
j(p
′
j + cj)+
∑
f Ef . The l.h.s. and r.h.s are the total money spent
and earned by all the agents respectively. Therefore, total surplus is zero. However, since surplus of
every agent is non-negative they all have to be zero. Further, note that the r.h.s is strictly positive,
hence at least one qijk is positive. Due to (17’) corresponding λi has to be positive, and in turn due to
(16’) z is the surplus of this agent, hence z = 0. ✷
The proof is by contradiction. Suppose there is a secondary ray, say R, in P ′. Recall that secondary
ray is an unbounded edge of set S (solutions of NHAD-LCP’) other than the primary ray, with z > 0.
Let R be incident on the vertex (y∗, z∗), with z∗ > 0, and has the direction vector (y◦, z◦). Then
R = {(y∗, z∗)+δ(y◦, z◦) | ∀δ ≥ 0}. The fact that every one of these points is a solution of NHAD-LCP’,
imposes such heavy constraints that no possibility remains assuming the sufficiency conditions of no
production out of nothing and strong connectivity.
All the contradictions uses the following simple fact: (y∗, z∗) + δ(y◦, z◦) needs to be a solution of
NHAD-LCP’ for unbounded values of δ. Let us start by showing that y◦ ≥ 0 and z◦ ≥ 0. If not, for
sufficiently large δ we will get a point that has a negative coordinate, contradicting a non-negativity
constraint on variables.
The vector y consists of six types of variables, i.e., y = (λ,p′, q,γ, r,β) (variables s and E are
just place holders). Let p′
◦
denote the price variables in the direction vector y◦.
Lemma 16 It is not possible that p′
◦
> 0.
Proof : Suppose p′
◦
> 0. Then, at every point of R with δ > 0, p′ > 0 and therefore by (15’) every
good is fully sold. Hence, by Lemma 15, z = 0, Now, we have already established that p′
∗
≥ 0 and
z◦ ≥ 0, and by definition of a ray, z∗ > 0. Therefore, at every point of R with δ > 0, z > 0 leading to
a contradiction. ✷
Next we consider the case when p′
◦
= 0.
Claim 17 If p′
◦
= 0 then y◦ = 0.
Proof : If p′
◦
= 0 then the price of each good remains constant on ray R. In turn optimal production
plans of firms do not change, and by (13) money spent on raw material cannot increase on all segments
except for the last ones. On the last ones also they cannot increase using (15) and Claim 8, giving
r◦ = 0 and β◦ = 0. Therefore, the total quantity of goods in the market remains the same. Since
by (15) no good can be oversold, q◦ = 0. Furthermore, the money earned by agent i through her
endowment and profit from firms remains unchanged throughout R. Therefore, the forced, flexible
and undesirable partitions of i remain unchanged and hence, corresponding to each of her undesirable
and partially allocated segments, γijk = 0 throughout R.
A consequence of strong connectivity is that each agent i must be non-satiated for some good, say
j. Hence there must be a segment (i, j, k), with uijk > 0, that is undesirable or partially allocated.
Now, in order to satisfy the constraint (17), λi cannot increase, forcing λ◦ = 0. As a result, for a
forced segment (i, j, k), γijk cannot increase – otherwise (17’) will force q
i
jk = 0. Putting this together
with the assertion about undesirable and partially allocated segments made above, we get that γ◦ = 0.
Hence, y◦ = 0. ✷
Lemma 18 If y◦ = 0 then y∗ = 0, i.e., R is the primary ray.
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Proof : Since the direction vector can not be all zeros we have z◦ > 0. Throughout R, for each
agent i the money spent and money earned remain unchanged; however, z increases. Therefore,∑
j w
i
jp
′
j +
∑
f θ
i
fEf −
∑
j,k q
i
jk − z < −
∑
j cjw
i
j at each point of R except possibly at the vertex of
polyhedron P ′. Hence λi has to be zero on the rest of the ray, forcing λ∗ = 0. Therefore, for each
segment, (17) is satisfied as a strict inequality, which forces q∗ = 0 by (17’).
If a good j is not used as a raw material then by (15’) its (p′
∗
)j is zero. There are no production
cycles by Claim 8. If a good is used as a raw material, i.e., rfjk > 0 for some (f, j, k), consider a
production chain containing it. In p′
∗
the p′∗ of the last good in this chain is zero by (15’), because
it is not used as a raw material. This contradicts rfjk > 0 by cascading using (12), (12’), and (13’).
These give p′
∗
= 0 and in turn (18’) forces γ∗ = 0. It together with (12’) also forces r∗ = 0 and in
turn (13’) forces β∗ = 0. Altogether we get y∗ = 0. ✷
Combining Claim 17 with Lemma 18 we get,
Lemma 19 It can not be the case that p′
◦
= 0 on R.
Lemma 20 Assuming no production out of nothing and enough demand, if p′
◦
6> 0 and p′
◦
6= 0 then
M violates strong connectivity.
Proof : Assume that p′
◦
6> 0 and p′
◦
6= 0. Let S ⊂ G be the set of goods for which the vector p′
◦
is
zero and S be the remaining goods; by assumption, both these sets are non-empty. Let A1 ⊆ A be the
set of agents who are non-satiated by at least one good in S. Clearly, the prices of goods in S remain
constant throughout R and those of goods in S go to infinity. Hence eventually, the bang-per-buck of
all segments corresponding to goods from S will dominate that of goods from S.
Let F be the set of firms producing goods of S and F be the remaining firms. Similarly, for any
firm in F all the segments corresponding to S will be profitable and will dominate that of goods from
S. Further, firms in F cannot produce anything using goods from S and their production does not
change on R. Therefore, their revenue remains constant on R.
By (15), each good in S is fully sold. Now, since only goods in S can remain unsold and their total
amount in the market is constant, the total surplus of all agents is bounded. Since z ≥ 0, by Claim
15 each agent has a non-negative surplus and hence the surplus of each agent is bounded.
Now, consider an agent i who has a good from S in her initial endowment. Since her earnings go to
infinity and her surplus is bounded, she must eventually buy up all segments corresponding to goods
in S for which she has positive utility. Similarly, consider a firm in F . Since the price of the good it
produces go to infinity, all its non-zero segments corresponding to goods in S will be profitable, and
hence will be produced fully. We will use these observations to derive contradictions based on what
A1 consist of.
Suppose A1 = A, then by the observation made above, any agent having a non-zero amount of a
good from S must eventually demand more than the available amount of some good in S, and available
amount of every good is bounded by Claim 8. contradicting (15).
If A1 = ∅, then consider an arbitrary agent i. For strong connectivity to hold, there must be some
agent i1 or a firm f ∈ F such that i has a good for which i1 or f is non-satiated. Since A1 = ∅ and
all the firms in F are satiated for all the goods in S, this good is from S. Hence each agent has a
good from S in her initial endowment. Let j ∈ S. Now, by the observation made above, all agents
will eventually buy all segments of j for which they have positive utility. Further, by Claim 8 there is
at least one good j ∈ S not getting produced, contradicting (15), since desire(j) > 1 (due to enough
demand condition).
Finally, suppose ∅ ⊂ A1 ⊂ A. An agents of A1 do not own any good from S, otherwise by
observation made above, demand of some good in S eventually goes to infinity, contradicting (15).
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Further, for the same reason firms of F are satiated for goods in S. This implies that in the graph
G(M) constructed in Definition 2 of Section 3.1 on firms and agents, there is no edge from A1 to
A \ A1, A1 to F , and F to F , implying that agent nodes in graph G(M) are not connected − strong
connectivity not satisfied. ✷
Putting everything together, Lemmas 16, 19 and 20 give:
Theorem 21 The polyhedron of NHAD-LCP’, corresponding to a market M under SPLC production
and SPLC utilities, satisfying strong connectivity, no production out of nothing and enough demand,
has no secondary rays.
Theorem 21 directly yields:
Theorem 22 If a market M with SPLC production and SPLC utilities satisfies strong connectivity,
no positive cycle and enough demand, then M admits an equilibrium and the algorithm in Table 1
terminates with one.
Theorem 22 settles the appropriate case of the open problem, posed by Eaves (1975) [15], as
described in the Introduction. Our algorithm also gives a constructive proof of the existence of
equilibrium for such markets.
Remark 23 If we run our algorithm on an arbitrary instance, without sufficiency conditions, then we
may end up on a secondary ray, however that does not imply anything whether equilibrium exists or
not. This is expected since checking existence even in its restriction to exchange markets with SPLC
utilities is NP-complete [39], and any such implication leads to showing NP=co-NP [30].
Remark 24 Note that the enough demand assumption is used only for the case when A1 = ∅ of
Lemma 20. Given a market not satisfying this condition, our algorithm may end up on a secondary
ray with the only possibility being this case. In that case, remove goods of S and firms of F from the
market. If firm f ∈ F can produce total d amount from a good j ∈ S, then remove P fj and change
endowments of agents as wijf = w
i
jf
+ θifd. Now, this reduced market is still strongly connected, and
has an equilibrium. Again apply the algorithm to find one. Now to get the equilibrium of the original
market set prices of goods in S to zero, and keep production plans of F as they are on the secondary
ray. Distribute goods in S freely to make all its segments forced for all the agents and to ensure
production at full capacity by firms of F from these goods. It is easy to see that such a construction
indeed gives a market equilibrium of the original market. This observation implies that even if the
given market does not satisfy enough demand condition, then one can find its equilibrium by running
the algorithm at most n times.
Theorem 25 Assuming strong connectivity, no positive cycle and enough demand, the problem of
computing an equilibrium of a market with SPLC utilities and SPLC production is in PPAD.
Proof : By Theorem 21, the Algorithm must converge to an equilibrium. Now, by Todd’s result
[37] on the orientability of the path followed by a complementary pivot algorithm, we get a proof of
membership of the problem in PPAD. ✷
Recall that the polyhedron P ′ corresponding to NHAD-LCP’ has inherent degeneracy as explained
in Section 6. The reason is that at any solution to NHAD-LCP with z = 0, the market clearing
conditions are satisfied and the dependence in the constraints established in Lemma 13 holds. We
have assumed that there are no other degeneracy except this in the polyhedron corresponding P ′. Let
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v be a vertex solution to NHAD-LCP’ with z = 0. Then it is easy to show that there is exactly one
j ∈ G with p′j = 0 at v. Relaxing p′j = 0 gives an unbounded edge, starting at v, at which z remains
zero. Therefore, every point of this edge corresponds to a market equilibrium in which the prices at v
are appropriately scaled.
Theorem 26 If a market M with SPLC production and SPLC utilities satisfies strong connectivity,
no positive cycle and enough demand, and its polyhedron P ′ corresponding to NHAD-LCP’ is non-
degenerate, then M has an odd number of equilibria, up to scaling.
Proof : As observed in Appendix A, the set of solutions S to NHAD-LCP’ consists of paths and
cycles. The solutions of NHAD-LCP’ satisfying z = 0 are precisely the solutions to NHAD-LCP. By
Theorem 14, the latter exactly capture the equilibria of market M, up to scaling. Now, the solutions
of NHAD-LCP’ satisfying z = 0 occur at endpoints of such paths (under non-degeneracy). One of
the paths starts with the primary ray and ends with an equilibrium. Since by Theorem 21 P ′ has
no secondary rays, the rest of the equilibria must be paired up. Hence there are an odd number of
equilibria. ✷
7 Strongly Polynomial Bound
In this section we show that our algorithm is strongly polynomial when either the number of goods
or number of agents plus number of firms is constant. We show a strongly polynomial bound on the
number of vertices in the solution set S of NHAD-LCP’, for each of the case. This in turn gives a
strongly polynomial bound for our algorithm which traverses a path in S.
In each case we create regions in a constant dimensional space by introducing strongly polynomially
many hyperplanes. We note that the number of non-empty regions formed by N hyperplanes in Rd
is at most O(Nd). Thus we get strongly polynomial bound on number of regions. After this we show
that at most two vertices of S can map to a region thus created. We extend the construction of [19].
The crucial addition in both the cases is to capture the optimal production plan for each firm and the
uncertainty about the amount of good available to agents at equilibrium.
7.1 Constant number of goods
For the constant number of goods consider the cell decomposition in (p1, . . . , pn, z)-space by adding
hyperplanes as follows: For each segment (f, j, k) of firms add αfjkpjf − pj = 0. For each 5-tuple
(i, j, j′, k, k′), where i ∈ A, j 6= j′ ∈ G, k ≤ |U ij | and k′ ≤ |U ij′ |, introduce hyperplane uijkpj′ −uij′k′pj =
0. These hyperplanes divide the space into cells and each cell has one of the signs <,=, > for each
hyperplane. For firm f let the Zf contains all the segments (f, j, k) with αfjkpjf − pj > 0, and let a
placeholder Ef = ∑(f,j,k)∈Zf ofjk(αfjkpjf − pj). For each agent, these signs give partial order on the
bang-per-buck of her segments. Using this information for a given cell, we can sort all segments (j, k)
of agent i by decreasing bang-per-buck, and partition them by equality into classes: Qi1, Q
i
2, · · · . Let
Qi<l denote Q
i
1 ∪Qi2 ∪ . . . ∪Qil−1. Similarly, we define Qi≤l and Qi>l.
Next we want to capture the flexible partition. To do this, we further subdivide a cell by adding
hyperplane
∑
(j,k)∈Qi
<l
lijkpj =
∑
j∈G wijpj+
∑
f∈F θ
i
fEf−z, for each agent i and each of her partitions
Qil. For any given subcell, let Q
i
li
be the right most partition such that
∑
(j,k)∈Qi
<li
lijkpj <
∑
j∈G wijpj+∑
f∈F θ
i
fEf − z, then Qili is the flexible partition for agent i. In addition, we add hyperplanes pj =
cj , ∀j ∈ G and z = 0, and consider only those cells where pj ≥ cj and z ≥ 0.
Given a fully-labeled vertex (y, z) of P ′, there is a natural cell associated with it, namely due to
projection of it on (p, z)-space by mapping p′j to p
′
j + cj and z to z itself.
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Lemma 27 At most two vertices of S can map to a region. Furthermore, if a region is mapped onto
from two vertices, then they must be adjacent.
Proof : Given a cell we specify one equality for every complementarity condition, to be satisfied
by the fully-labeled vertex mapping to it. A fully labeled vertex v = (λ,p′, q,γ, r,β, z), which maps
onto a given cell must satisfy the following equalities. In the cell,
• If αfjkpjf − pj ≥ 0 then αfjkp′jf − p′j − β
f
jk = cj − αfjkcjf else rfjk = 0 at v.
• If αfjkpjf − pj ≤ 0 then βfjk = 0 else rfjk − ofjkp′j = ofjkcj at v.
• If pj > cj then
∑
i,k q
i
jk +
∑
f,k r
f
jk − p′j −
∑
f∈F(j),j′,k s
f
j′k = cj else p
′
j = 0 at v.
• If∑j wijpj+
∑
j θ
i
fEf−z ≥ 0 (second set of hyperplanes for the tuple (i, 1)) then
∑
j w
i
j(p
′
j + cj)+∑
f θ
i
fEf −
∑
j,k q
i
jk − z = 0 else λi = 0 at v.
• If uijkpj′ − uij′k′pj ≥ 0 for a (j′, k′) ∈ Qili then uijkλi − p′j − γijk = cj else qijk = 0 at v.
• If uijkpj′ − uij′k′pj ≤ 0 for a (j′, k′) ∈ Qili then γijk = 0 else qijk − lijkp′j = lijkcj at v.
Since the above conditions enforces one equality from each complementary condition of NHAD-
LCP’, their intersection forms a line. If this line does not intersect P ′, no fully labeled vertex gets
mapped to the given cell. If it does then intersection can be either a fully labeled vertex, say v, or a
fully labeled edge – we say that an edge of the polyhedron P ′ is fully labeled if the solution represented
by each point of this edge is fully labeled. In the former case only vertex v gets mapped to the cell
and in the latter case endpoints of the fully labeled edge map to the cell. ✷
7.2 Constant number of agents and firms
Let G(F) be the set of goods produced by the firms, and let they be numbered {1, . . . , a} (wlog). Let
m denote the number of agents. In this section we consider segment configurations for every good.
Consider a λ1, . . . , λm, p1, . . . , pa-space.
Again for every segment (f, j, k), where j ∈ G(F), add αfjkpjf − pj = 0. For every segment (i, j, k),
where j ∈ G(F), add uijkλi − pj = 0. These capture segment configurations for goods in G(F). Add
λi ≥ 0,∀i ∈ A and pj ≥ cj ,∀j ∈ G(F), where cj ’s are the constants obtained by solving (11).
Next for every good outside G(F) we consider partition of segments (i, j, k) and (f, j, k) together
using the following observation. Given a fully labeled vertex, for a good j consider the value uijkλi
for segments (i, j, k) and αfjk(p
′
jf
+ cjf ) for segments (f, j, k). Sort them in decreasing order and
partition them by equality. It is easy to verify that at this vertex, good j gets allocated to agents and
firms (as a raw material) in the order of partitions, starting from the first. We call the last allocated
partition as flexible partition, all the partitions before it as forced partitions and all partitions after
it as undesirable partitions for good j. Further, let (i, j, k) or (f, j, k) be a segment in the flexible
partition of good j, then, we have uijkλi = p
′
j + cj or α
f
jk(p
′
jf
+ cjf ) = p
′
j + cj respectively. Therefore,
the flexible partition of any good defines its price.
Next we capture the segment configurations for each good not in G(F). Let G(F) = G \ G(F).
Introduce following three types of hyperplanes:
• uijkλi − ui
′
jk′λi′ = 0 for each (i, i
′, j, k, k′), where i 6= i′ ∈ A, j ∈ G(F), k ≤ |U ij | and k′ ≤ |U i
′
j |.
• uijkλi − αfjk′pjf = 0 for each (i, j, k, f, k′), where i ∈ A, j ∈ G(F), k ≤ |U ij |, and k′ ≤ |P fj |.
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• αfjkpjf − αf
′
jk′pjf ′ = 0 for each (f, f
′, j, k, k′), where f 6= f ′ ∈ F , j ∈ G(F), k ≤ |P fj | and
k′ ≤ |P f ′j |.
Given a cell, the signs of these hyperplanes in the cell give partial order of segments (i, j, k) and
(f, j, k) for every good j ∈ G(F). For a good j sort its segments in decreasing order using this partial
order, and partition them by equality in classes: Qj1, Q
j
2, · · · . Since j is not produced its available
amount is always 1. Next we capture the flexible partition for good j. For a fully sold good, it may be
computed easily by just summing up the segment lengths, lijk for (i, j, k) and o
f
jk for (f, j, k), starting
from the first partition until it becomes 1. However, a fully labeled vertex may have undersold goods.
Since the price of such a good is fixed to cj (p
′
j is zero), segments (i, j, k) and (f, j, k) in its flexible
partition have uijkλi = cj and α
f
jkpjf = cjf . To capture this we introduce u
i
jkλi − cj = 0 for each
(i, j, k) and αfjkpjf − cjf = 0 for each (f, j, k). In general the flexible partition for good j is the earlier
one of the two: partition when good is fully sold and the partition with value cj . This can be easily
deduced for a given cell from the signs of the hyperplanes. Let Qjlj be the flexible partition of j.
A fully-labeled vertex (y, z) maps naturally to (λ, p1, . . . , pa)-space, by mapping λi to λi and p
′
j to
p′j + cj . Analogues to Lemma 27 we get the following result.
Lemma 28 At most two vertices of S can map to a region. Furthermore, if a region is mapped onto
from two vertices, then they must be adjacent.
It is clear that our algorithm follows a systematic path instead of a brute force enumeration of all
the cells. The next theorem follows directly from Lemmas 27 and 28, since the number of hyperplane
introduced is strongly polynomial in both the cases.
Theorem 29 For a market, under SPLC production and SPLC utilities, with a constant number of
goods, or agents and firms, our algorithm computes an equilibrium in strongly polynomial time.
8 Reduction: Exchange to Production
In this section we give a reduction from an exchange market to an equivalent Arrow-Debreu market
with production and linear utility functions. The main idea is to introduce a firm for each agent
which essentially produces utility for the agent. A similar reduction was also given in [25] but for
homogeneous utility functions.
The firms introduced by this reduction output exactly one good. For these firms, we can define
the extreme points of production set Yf via a production function P f : Rn−1+ → R+, which takes the
amount of each input good used and outputs the amount of the produced good.
Consider an exchange market M with a set A of agents and a set G of goods, where utility
function of agent i is U i and wi is her endowment vector. Let m = |A| and n = |G|. Recall that U i
is a non-decreasing (non-negative), continuous and concave function. Now we construct an equivalent
Arrow-Debreu market with linear utilitiesM′: Goods map to goods. For every agent i ofM, we create
a good n+ i, a firm i with production function P i = U i producing good n+ i, and an agent i with the
same initial endowment and non-zero utility for good n+ i only, i.e., for a bundle x = (x1, . . . , xn+m),
U ′i(x) = xn+i. Further, agent i owns the firm i, i.e., θii = 1.
Let pii(p) denotes the maximum profit of firm i at prices p. Since among all the firms and agents
only agent i wants good n + i, all the production of firm i will be bought by her at equilibrium.
Further, since agent i is interested in only good n+ i and there is no initial endowment of good n+ i,
she will put all her earnings in buying all the output of firm i. Hence her total budget, wi · p+ pii(p),
should be equal to revenue of firm i at equilibrium. Let ri be the input bundle used by firm i at an
optimal production plan for prices p. Equating these two, we get wi · p = ri · p.
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Using this and the fact that no firm uses the new goods as raw material the next lemma follows
easily. For a C ⊆ G, let pC denotes the vector with coordinates corresponding to C only.
Lemma 30 There is a one-to-one correspondence between equilibria of M′ and equilibria of M.
Proof : Let p′ be equilibrium prices of M′ and let p = p′G . Let ri be the bundle of raw material
used by firm i at equilibrium. Since P i = U i and since ri maximizes profit p′n+iP
i(r) − r · p′G and
satisfies wi · p′ = ri · p′, it should also be an optimal bundle of agent i in M at prices p. Market
clearing follows.
For the reverse mapping, it is easy to verify that p′, where p′G = p and p′n+i be the inverse of the
marginal utility per unit of money of agent i, gives an equilibrium for M′. ✷
Examples of “form X” in the next theorem are linear, SPLC, Leontief, (non-separable) PLC etc.
Theorem 31 An exchange market with utility functions of the form X can be reduced to an equivalent
Arrow-Debreu market with linear utilities and production functions of the form X.
The next theorem follows using hardness results for exchange markets with SPLC utilities [4, 6,
39, 9], and Theorems 25 and 31.
Theorem 32 The problem of computing an equilibrium of an AD market with linear utilities and
SPLC production is PPAD-complete, assuming the weakest known sufficiency conditions by Maxfield
[29]. In general checking existence of an equilibrium in these markets is NP-complete.
Proof : Containment in PPAD assuming the sufficiency conditions by Maxfield follows from Theo-
rem 25. Given prices of goods, checking if they are equilibrium prices can be done in polynomial time
using the characterization of Section 4, hence containment in NP follows in general.
Both the hardness follows from the hardness results for exchange markets with SPLC utilities
[4, 6, 39, 9] and Theorem 31. ✷
9 Experimental Results
We coded our algorithm in Matlab and ran it on randomly generated instances of markets with SPLC
production and SPLC utility functions. Number of segments are kept the same in all the utility and
production functions, let it be denoted by #seg. An instance is created by picking values uniformly at
random – wijs from [0, 1], θ
i
f ’s from [0, 1], u
i
jk’s from [0, 1], l
i
jk’s from [0, 10/#seg], α
f
jk from [0, 1] (in
order to avoid positive cycles in production) and ofjk’s from [0, 10/#seg]. For simplicity we assume
that firm a produces good a. For every firm f , θif ’s are scaled so that they sum up to one. Similarly,
for every good j, wij’s are scaled so that they sum up to one. For each pair of agent i and good j, u
i
jk’s
are sorted in decreasing order to get PLC U ij , and similarly for each pair of firm f and good j, α
f
jk’s
are sorted in decreasing order to get PLC P fj . The experimental results are given in Table 2. Note
that, even in the worst case the number of iterations is always linear in the total number of segments
in all the input functions. Total number of segments in a market with n goods, m agents and l firms
is (mn+ l(n− 1))#seg.
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Table 2: Experimental Results
#agents, #goods, #firms, #seg #Instances Min Avg Max
2, 2, 2, 2 100 8 13.61 18
5, 5, 5, 2 100 34 68.85 99
5, 5, 5, 5 100 163 227.58 291
10, 5, 5, 2 100 70 119.95 148
10, 5, 5, 5 100 104 396.98 472
10, 10, 10, 2 100 118 224.67 275
10, 10, 10, 5 10 260 714.5 905
10, 10, 10, 10 10 326 1486.3 2210
15, 5, 5, 2 100 141 173.24 214
15, 5, 5, 5 100 500 581.42 684
15, 10, 10, 2 100 219 295.84 374
15, 10, 10, 5 10 1186 1934.3 2833
15, 10, 10, 10 10 2678 2853.2 3190
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A The Linear Complementarity Problem and Lemke’s Algorithm
Given an n × n matrix M , and a vector q, the linear complementarity problem asks for a vector y
satisfying the following conditions:
My ≤ q, y ≥ 0, q −My ≥ 0 and y · (q −My) = 0. (20)
The problem is interesting only when q 6≥ 0, since otherwise y = 0 is a trivial solution. Let us
introduce slack variables v to obtain the equivalent formulation
My + v = q, y ≥ 0, v ≥ 0 and y · v = 0. (21)
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Let P be the polyhedron in 2n dimensional space defined by the first three conditions; we will
assume that P is non-degenerate. Under this condition, any solution to (21) will be a vertex of P,
since it must satisfy 2n equalities. Note that the set of solutions may be disconnected.
An ingenious idea of Lemke was to introduce a new variable and consider the system:
My + v − z1 = q, y ≥ 0, v ≥ 0, z ≥ 0 and y · v = 0. (22)
Let P ′ be the polyhedron in 2n + 1 dimensional space defined by the first four conditions; again
we will assume that P ′ is non-degenerate. Since any solution to (22) must still satisfy 2n equalities,
the set of solutions, say S, will be a subset of the one-skeleton of P ′, i.e., it will consist of edges and
vertices of P ′. Any solution to the original system must satisfy the additional condition z = 0 and
hence will be a vertex of P ′.
Now S turns out to have some nice properties. Any point of S is fully labeled in the sense that for
each i, yi = 0 or vi = 0. We will say that a point of S has double label i if yi = 0 and vi = 0 are both
satisfied at this point. Clearly, such a point will be a vertex of P ′ and it will have only one double
label. Since there are exactly two ways of relaxing this double label, this vertex must have exactly
two edges of S incident at it. Clearly, a solution to the original system (i.e., satisfying z = 0) will
be a vertex of P ′ that does not have a double label. On relaxing z = 0, we get the unique edge of S
incident at this vertex.
As a result of these observations, we can conclude that S consists of paths and cycles. Of these
paths, Lemke’s algorithm explores a special one. An unbounded edge of S such that the vertex of P ′
it is incident on has z > 0 is called a ray. Among the rays, one is special – the one on which y = 0.
This is called the primary ray and the rest are called secondary rays. Now Lemke’s algorithm explores,
via pivoting, the path starting with the primary ray. This path must end either in a vertex satisfying
z = 0, i.e., a solution to the original system, or a secondary ray. In the latter case, the algorithm is
unsuccessful in finding a solution to the original system; in particular, the original system may not
have a solution.
Remark: Observe that z1 can be replaced by za, where vector a has a 1 in each row in which q is
negative and has either a 0 or a 1 in the remaining rows, without changing its role; in our algorithm,
we will set a row of a to 1 if and only if the corresponding row of q is negative. As mentioned above, if
q has no negative components, (20) has the trivial solution y = 0. Additionally, in this case Lemke’s
algorithm cannot be used for finding a non-trivial solution, since it is simply not applicable.
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